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The challenge of reform: plus ça change?
Tax–benefit reform has always required 
hard choices. Take the Beveridge report 
(published in Britain in 1942), which 
shaped the development of family 
allowances in liberal welfare states just 
after the Second World War. In his report 
Beveridge faced a challenge in ensuring 
income adequacy for families with children 
within a competitive labour market where 
wages are paid to individuals. This meant 
that: 
when wages were low and family sizes 
large the income from work could fail 
to provide an adequate family income 
and be less than the income from 
government transfers when not 
working. The design of family 
allowances therefore needed to balance 
the goals of ensuring adequate family 
incomes and encouraging labour 
supply. This balance had to be found 
within the constraint of limited 
government funds. (Nolan, P., 2006)
Partly reflecting the challenge above – 
along with ideas of fairness of reward and 
socially acceptable incomes – governments 
have not simply relied on competitive 
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labour markets to set wages. Indeed, New 
Zealand has a long history with national 
minimum wages (since the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894), 
and in recent years there has been interest 
in concepts like living wages, pre-
distribution (e.g., reducing inequality in 
the distribution of gross incomes), and the 
share of national income going to labour 
(the labour income share (Conway, Meehan 
and Parham, 2015; Rosenberg, 2017; Fraser, 
2018)).
But even with the help of wage policies 
governments cannot avoid hard choices 
when undertaking tax–benefit reform. Not 
only are wage policies themselves subject to 
trade-offs (e.g., potentially having an impact 
on employment), but the interaction 
between wage changes and tax–benefit 
policies is a constraint on outcomes. Take 
the example of an increase in the minimum 
wage. As Table 1 shows, increases in the 
minimum wage may raise a worker’s gross 
wage income (assuming no change in their 
employment or hours of work), but the 
change in their take-home pay (net income) 
is less clear, due to taxation and the 
abatement of transfers. Indeed, in some 
cases (e.g., where workers face the dollar-
for-dollar abatement of the minimum 
family tax credit and ACC levy), income in 
the hand may fall. However, this should not 
be read as suggesting that there is no point 
to increasing wages; it simply highlights that 
it is not possible to say that an increase in a 
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minimum wage (or introduction of a living 
wage) will always translate into 
proportionately higher incomes in the hand.
In some ways the challenge of reform 
is getting harder. Like many countries over 
the last half-century, New Zealand has seen 
a shift from the breadwinner model of 
social arrangements, with more sole-parent 
and dual-income families (reflecting 
increasing participation rates of female 
workers) and increasing participation rates 
of older workers (Nolan, P., 2006). Further, 
while the income tax and benefit systems 
were largely devised as separate systems, 
large proportions of the population are 
now affected by both simultaneously 
(Stephens, 1997), given the taxation of 
main benefits and the provision of 
supplementary assistance, like Working for 
Families, to non-benefit families. These 
changes have increased the complexity of 
designing and implementing reform to 
tax–benefit programmes.
What effective marginal tax rates tell us 
about the tax–benefit interface
One way to illustrate the interaction of 
tax and benefit programmes is to model 
effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs). 
EMTRs show how gross wages interact with 
the personal income tax scale, main welfare 
benefits and supplementary assistance (e.g., 
tax credits). They show the combination of 
taxation and abatement of benefits and are 
usually measured over the next dollar of 
income. They require detailed modelling 
of both the interaction of a number of 
tax–benefit programmes and the income 
distribution. This can be a difficult exercise 
and can be subject to controversy. Nolan 
(2018), for example, required five pages 
and close to 50 variables to provide a 
basic algebraic description of how to 
calculate EMTRs in New Zealand, even 
with a number of important programmes 
(including accommodation assistance, 
childcare subsidies, child support, student 
support/loans, paid parental leave, etc.) 
excluded from the calculations.
EMTR profiles and budget constraints 
are produced for this article with a 
spreadsheet model based on the approach 
in Nolan (2018). This model shows the 
interaction of key tax–benefit programmes 
only (e.g., it does not model the interaction 
of these programmes with the income 
distribution). The analysis is static and 
several important tax–benefit programmes 
are not included. However, limiting coverage 
to main benefits, income and social security 
taxes (e.g., the ACC earners’ levy) and tax 
credits can provide a more general picture. 
Including accommodation assistance would, 
for example, mean that results would vary 
depending on where families live and 
whether they own or rent their 
accommodation. In contrast, the approach 
taken in this article allows a wide range of 
scenarios to be easily compared. The only 
parameters needed are the family’s civil 
status, wage rate (or rates if a dual-income 
couple) and number and ages of children, 
and key policy features. Future work could 
build on this general picture by considering 
the interaction of a fuller set of tax–benefit 
programmes. Identifying the appropriate 
scenarios for this fuller assessment would 
require a detailed assessment of factors such 
as the distributions of wage rates and hours 
of work (see the discussion on EMTRs in 
their labour market context below).
For illustrative purposes, the modelling 
in this article is undertaken for two scenario 
families: 
•	 the	first	family	is	a	sole	parent	earning	
an hourly gross wage rate of $16.50 
(minimum wage as at 1 April 2018) and 
with two children aged two and five; 
Table 1: Changes in weekly income in the hand when gross hourly wages change  
(sole parent with two young children)
20 hours of work 30 hours of work 40 hours of work
Change 
in gross 
income
Change 
in net 
income
Change 
in gross 
income
Change 
in net 
income
Change 
in gross 
income
Change 
in net 
income
Wage increase from 
$16.50 to $17.50  $20.00 –$0.28  $30.00 –$0.42  $40.00  $32.44 
Wage increase from 
$16.50 to $20.00  $70.00 –$0.98 
 
$105.00  $9.39 
 
$140.00 
 
$113.55 
Source: Author’s calculations
Note: Further detail on the assumptions employed in this table can be found in the discussion of the sole-parent scenario (scenario 
one) below. These calculations do not account for the effect of a number of key programmes (including accommodation assistance, 
childcare subsidies, child support, student support/loans and paid parental leave).
Box 1 The government’s  
Families Package
•	 The	government’s	Families	Package	largely	took	effect	from	the	1	April	
2018	tax	year.	This	package	contained	changes	to	the	Working	for	Families	
tax	credits,	the	introduction	of	a	Best	Start	Tax	Credit,	changes	to	the	
Accommodation	Supplement,	and	the	introduction	of	a	Winter	Energy	
Payment.	From	1	April	2018	the	adult	minimum	wage	also	increased	to	
$16.50	from	$15.75.
•	 The	changes	to	Working	for	Families	included	no	longer	varying	the	family	
tax	credit	rates	by	age	of	child	(different	rates	for	the	eldest	and	additional	
children	remain),	increasing	the	Minimum	Family	Tax	Credit,	and	increasing	
the	Working	for	Families	abatement	threshold	and	abatement	rate.
•	 The	Best	Start	Tax	Credit	was	introduced	to	replace	the	parental	tax	credit.	
For	children	up	to	the	age	of	one	this	provides	a	universal	transfer	and	for	
children	older	than	one	and	younger	than	three	this	provides	a	targeted	
transfer.	Payments	will	only	be	made	for	children	born	after	1	July	2018,	but	
in	the	modelling	in	this	article	it	is	assumed	this	programme	is	now	fully	in	
place.
•	 The	Independent	Earner	Tax	Credit	was	retained	in	the	Families	Package	(the	
previous	government	had	planned	to	remove	this	programme).
•	 Changes	to	the	Accommodation	Supplement	and	the	introduction	of	the	
Winter	Energy	Payment	are	not	included	in	the	modelling	in	this	article.
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•	 the	second	family	is	a	partnered	person	
earning an hourly gross wage rate of 
$25.00 and with a working spouse and 
two children aged two and five. The 
working spouse is assumed to earn a 
fixed income of $1,000 gross per week 
(at a wage rate of $25.00 per hour and 
40 hours of work per week).
Families are assumed to have two 
children as this is a relatively common 
structure for partnered families and, 
although sole parents tend to be in single-
child families, the incidence of poverty and 
significance of poverty traps can be 
expected to increase with the number of 
children in the family. Assistance is 
modelled over a range of hours of work for 
a family type at a fixed wage rate. These 
wage rates were chosen as they illustrate 
the current minimum wage and the median 
hourly earnings for men. It is assumed that 
wage rates, hours of work and family 
structures do not vary during the year.
Scenarios
Sole parent on minimum wage
The first scenario is a sole parent on 
minimum wage. The programmes 
modelled include aspects of the 
government’s recent Families Package (see 
Box 1), and to simplify the presentation 
of the results it is assumed the Best Start 
programme is fully in operation.1
Figure 1 shows the sources of income 
received by the sole parent. Based on 
current benefit rates at zero hours of work 
this person is estimated to receive (after 
tax) an unabated main benefit of $334.05 
and family tax credit and Best Start 
payments of $264.29. The result is an 
income in the hand of $598.34 a week. 
Note that this net income does not include 
accommodation support and several other 
transfers and it is assumed that the Best 
Start programme is fully in operation.
There is an earnings disregard of $100 
per week and so for the first few hours of 
work this person’s gross earnings are 
reduced by the second rate of income tax 
(17.5%) and the ACC earner levy (1.39%) 
only.2 The person faces the second rate of 
income tax (and not the lower rate) as the 
main benefit is included in taxable income. 
This leads to an EMTR of 18.9% (note: all 
EMTRs are rounded to one decimal place 
in this article). At just over six hours of work 
the main benefit starts abating at a rate of 
30%. As noted above, the net main benefit 
abates against increases in gross income. 
The result is an increase in the EMTR to 
48.9%.3
Once gross non-benefit earnings 
increase to $200 per week the main benefit 
starts to abate at a rate of 70%. This takes 
place at just over 12 hours of work and 
leads to an EMTR of 88.9%. At this point 
the sole parent’s net income is around 
$730.60. Note that at just over 17 hours of 
work the value of the abated main benefit 
has fallen to a level that means that the 
income tax rate applying to this benefit is 
now the lower rate (of 10.5%), not the 
second rate, and so the EMTR falls to 
83.4%. At this point the net income is 
around $740.80.
At 20 hours of work the sole parent 
becomes eligible for the work-based 
components of Working for Families, 
particularly the minimum family tax credit 
and the in-work tax credit. It is not possible 
to receive these work-based components 
and the main benefit simultaneously. This 
leads to a boost in net income of $87.51 
(from $747.19 to $834.69). There is thus a 
relatively strong incentive to satisfy the 
statutory hours-based work threshold. The 
minimum family tax credit provides a 
guaranteed minimum family income and 
so abates at a rate of 100% against any 
increases in earnings until it is fully 
exhausted. The combination of this 
abatement and the ACC levy results in an 
EMTR of 101.4%. Net income thus 
decreases very slightly against increases in 
earnings until around 36 hours of work.
Once the sole parent has exited the 
minimum family tax credit the EMTR falls 
to 18.9%, and it remains at this level until 
their earned income is sufficient for them 
to face abatement of their Working for 
Families tax credits and (later) put them 
into higher income tax brackets. Abatement 
of the Best Start programme begins at 
$79,000, but with a $16.50 gross wage it is 
highly unlikely that the family would face 
this abatement (note that if the youngest 
child was under one then no abatement of 
this programme takes place). In this 
scenario the abatement of Working for 
Families begins at around 50 hours of work 
a week.
An additional perspective on the tax–
benefit interface can be provided by 
comparing the net income at zero hours of 
work with the net income when in work 
(the net replacement rate). Replacement 
rates can be calculated based on the same 
information as above, although it is 
important to note that they will vary 
depending on the number of hours at 
which it is assumed that the person is in 
work. They are thus calculated for a range 
of hours of work: with a net income at zero 
hours of work of $598.34, the income when 
out of work is equivalent to (replaces) 84% 
of the income at 10 hours of work, 80% at 
20 hours of work, 72% at 30 hours, and 
67% at 40 hours. Note that these 
calculations do not account for the effect 
of a number of key programmes and 
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Figure 1:  EMTR profile and budget constraint for a minimum wage sole parent with 
two children
Source: Author’s calculations
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various in-work costs (such as childcare 
and transport costs).
Median earner with working spouse and 
children
The second scenario is the case of a 
partnered parent earning around median 
hourly earnings ($25 per hour) and a 
working spouse (assumed to work 40 
hours at $25 per hour). As with the earlier 
scenario, the family has two young children. 
Again, the programmes modelled include 
key features of the government’s Families 
Package and it is assumed the Best Start 
programme is fully in operation.
As the parent in Figure 2 is assumed to 
have a spouse who is already in work, the 
EMTR they face immediately upon 
entering the workforce is 36.9%. This 
EMTR is a combination of the lowest 
(10.5%) personal tax rate and (1.39%) 
ACC levy (both based on individual 
income) and (25%) Working for Families 
abatement (based on family income). At 
around 11 hours of work the person 
moves onto a higher income tax rate of 
17.5% and so the EMTR increases to 
43.9%.
At 20 hours of work the abatement of 
the Best Start programme begins, leading 
to a more significant increase in EMTRs 
(from 43.9% to 64.9%). EMTRs remain 
at this level until the Best Start payment 
is fully abated (at around 32 hours of 
work). As the generosity of the Working 
for Families tax credits has increased 
under the Families Package, the abatement 
of these programmes takes place over a 
longer range of hours of work. Thus, 
abatement continues until around 37 
hours of work.
The changes to Working for Families 
mean that this programme now interacts 
with the $48,000 personal income tax 
threshold. At this income for this family 
the Working for Families tax credits are 
almost already fully exhausted (providing 
less than $1) and so a higher EMTR is faced 
over only a very small range of earnings. 
This explains the spike in the EMTR profile 
at around 37 hours of work.
As with the earlier scenario, an 
additional perspective on the tax–benefit 
interface can be provided by comparing 
the income from zero hours of work with 
the income when in work (the net 
replacement rate). As one parent in this 
family is assumed to always be in work 
(earning $1,000 gross per week), these 
replacement rates are calculated for the 
other (second) earner. Thus, with a net 
family income when the second earner is 
out of work of $1,111.91, the family income 
with one worker is equivalent to (replaces) 
88% of the family income when the second 
earner also works 10 hours, 79% at 20 
hours of second-earner work, 74% at 30 
hours, and 68% at 40 hours. Note that 
these calculations do not account for the 
effect of a number of key programmes and 
in-work costs (such as childcare and 
transport costs).
What can we learn from these profiles?
Although EMTRs are only a partial 
measure of the effect of the tax–benefit 
interface,4 scenarios like those above still 
illustrate several points (Nolan, P., 2018). 
For instance:
•	 Putting	 differences	 in	 wage	 rates	
between family types to the side, 
beneficiaries without children working 
for small numbers of hours face higher 
EMTRs than beneficiary parents. This 
reflects the higher earnings disregards 
(income that can be earned before 
abatement begins) facing beneficiary 
parents.
•	 However,	 as	 these	 disregards	 have	
changed little over the last decade and 
a half (Nolan, M., 2018a), their real 
value (and thus the difference between 
family types) has fallen.
•	 Nonetheless,	for	all	beneficiaries,	once	
full abatement of the main benefit 
begins there are few incentives to work 
until income is sufficient to exit the 
benefit. 
•	 The	disincentives	for	parents	take	place	
over a wider range of hours of work, 
reflecting the lower abatement at lower 
hours of work (for sole parents), higher 
levels of assistance, and abatement of 
the Working for Families tax credits.
Thus, not only are there trade-offs 
between different objectives of the tax–
benefit interface but there are trade-offs 
within objectives too. Efforts to improve 
the incentives to work at one point can 
worsen the incentives elsewhere. An 
analogy can be drawn with a balloon. It is 
possible to squeeze a balloon downwards, 
but – unless the overall volume of air in 
the balloon reduces – this will lead to it 
expanding out sideways. To give a practical 
example, an increase in an earnings 
disregard may improve the financial 
returns from a very small number of hours 
of work but is likely to come at an economic 
cost of worsening incentives for longer 
hours of work or work at higher wage rates.
The only way this could be avoided 
(aside from moving away from targeting 
by income) is to provide less assistance 
overall, which may, of course, conflict with 
other objectives. This means that when 
evaluating EMTRs it is difficult to avoid 
becoming an archetypal ‘two-handed 
economist’. As former US president Harry 
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Figure 2:  EMTR profile and budget constraint for a median earner with 
working spouse and two children
Source: Author’s calculations
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Truman once said: ‘Give me a one-handed 
economist. All my economists say “on one 
hand”, then “but on the other”.’ To avoid 
this trap of simply highlighting trade-offs 
it can be useful to consider the specific 
location of ‘notches’ (areas of high EMTRs) 
and how these interact with wage rates and 
the distribution of hours of work.
EMTRs in their labour market context
This article does not include primary 
analysis of the distribution of hours of 
work by wage rate and family type. While 
there has been some work undertaken on 
this topic in New Zealand at the Treasury 
and Victoria University of Wellington 
(see, for example, Mercante and Mok, 
2014a, 2014b; Nolan, M., 2018b), this is 
an area where further research would be 
valuable. Nonetheless, as Mercante and 
Mok found:
•	 employment	rates	tend	to	be	highest	
for partnered men and lowest for 
partnered women and single parents 
(who are mostly women);
•	 average	working	hours	of	workers	are	
highest for partnered men and lowest 
for partnered women and single 
parents. This is primarily due to the 
higher prevalence of part-time working 
hours for the latter two groups, while 
partnered men work predominantly 
full-time at 40 hours or more; and
•	 single	 men	 tend	 to	 have	 lower	
employment rates than partnered men, 
and, of those who work, single men are 
more likely to work full-time than 
partnered women or single parents. 
(Mercante and Mok, 2014a, p.11)
The practical significance of these 
different distributions of hours of work can 
be illustrated with a finding in Creedy, 
Mercante and Mok (2018). They show that 
the requirement for couples to work at least 
30 hours to qualify for in-work assistance 
is unlikely to have had much of an effect 
on labour supply given the fact that most 
married men are already working for at 
least 40 hours.
The messages emerging on these 
distributions of hours of work appear 
broadly consistent with the findings from 
international work. For example, Blundell 
(2012, pp.47–8) noted that over the last 
three decades in the UK, France and the 
United States:
•	 hours	 of	 work	 are	 often	 found	 to	
respond less than employment decisions;
•	 for	men,	variations	 in	 the	 extensive	
margin (e.g., whether to work) occur 
mainly at the beginning and end of 
their working lives (schooling–work 
and early retirement margins);
•	 hours	 differences,	 conditional	 on	
employment, also matter for men and 
they matter across the working life;
•	 for	women,	both	employment	itself	and	
hours vary across working lives;
•	 the	extensive	margin	is	also	relatively	
important for women in the early and 
later periods of working life; and
•	 hours	of	work	for	women	show	more	
variation over the life cycle, especially 
around childbearing age. As they noted, 
for ‘women with younger children it is 
not usually just an employment 
decision that is important, it is also 
whether to work part-time or full-time’ 
(p.48).
One outstanding question in New 
Zealand is how EMTR profiles and the 
distribution of hours of work interact, and 
particularly whether these incentives 
encourage a ‘bimodal’ distribution of 
hours of work where low-wage families 
cluster at either low hours (and weak 
attachment to the labour market) or high 
hours of work.
There does not appear to be a simple 
relationship between low wages and hours 
of work. Recent work by the New Zealand 
Work Research Institute (Cochrane et al., 
n.d.) on low pay showed that workers with 
relatively low wage rates tended to have a 
weak attachment to the labour market and 
relatively short employment spells. Yet we 
also know that New Zealand has relatively 
high working hours by international 
standards. The 2013 Census showed that 
around one in five people worked for 50 
hours or more a week, although this was 
down from 23% in 2006 and 25% in 2001. 
Earlier research (Fursman, 2008, 2009) 
showed that the type of households that 
long-hours workers lived in were similar 
to those of the total workforce, and while 
workers with high incomes were most 
likely to work long hours, the majority of 
long-hours workers were in lower income 
brackets. It is likely that some families need 
to work longer hours because their wage 
rates are low. This can reflect the presence 
of poverty traps (periods of high EMTRs), 
as with lower wage rates more hours of 
work are needed to leap over areas of high 
EMTRs.
What does this mean for policy?
The discussion above raises a number 
of questions for policymakers, but given 
space limitations just one issue – the 
degree to which assistance is targeted 
according to work effort – is discussed 
below. In New Zealand the decision to 
target work effort has been the subject of 
debate. Some commentators have argued 
that the Working for Families tax credits 
should not be targeted on these grounds. 
Yet maintaining a margin between the 
income from welfare and income from 
work is important to ensure work provides 
a route out of poverty. Some have argued 
that the EMTRs created by the abatement 
of assistance weaken the effectiveness 
of this strategy, yet if this is of concern 
the logical reform would address any 
disincentives facing the working poor, not 
provide additional assistance to people 
out of work. To cite the working poor as a 
reason for extending in-work assistance to 
non-working households is a non sequitur.
Indeed, providing assistance targeted 
to the working poor is consistent with a 
view that families in work require 
additional assistance given the particular 
costs that working families face and that 
families out of work do not (such as 
...maintaining a margin between the 
income from welfare and income from 
work is important to ensure work 
provides a route out of poverty.
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transport and childcare costs). It could be 
argued that it is, alternatively, possible to 
provide support to both people out of work 
and the working poor. However, given 
fiscal constraints, reducing the degree of 
targeting of particular programmes would 
increase expenditure (including to people 
not in poverty) and so require some 
combination of reductions in spending on 
other tax–benefit programmes, reductions 
in spending elsewhere, and/or an increase 
in tax burdens (Nolan, P., 2018). And there 
are trade-offs in the design of financial 
incentives within an EMTR schedule.
In a review of how Anglo-American 
countries have designed tax credits to 
support the working poor, Nolan (Nolan, 
P., 2006, 2018) showed that no one 
approach has been universally favoured. 
Countries have varied in the emphasis 
placed on work-related criteria relative to 
demographic criteria, particularly as work-
related criteria are likely to be relatively 
responsive to the design of programmes 
themselves.5 Further, while New Zealand 
is not especially unusual in targeting work 
effort, the approach taken (e.g., with tax 
credits requiring both non-receipt of a 
main benefit and satisfying hours-based 
tests) appears relatively sensitive to 
fluctuations in families’ incomes 
throughout the year.
There is thus scope for New Zealand to 
target work effort in a simpler way. Options 
include removing the hours-based work 
test for tax credits, which would in turn 
require re-evaluating the design and level 
of the minimum family tax credit and in-
work tax credit. There are also 
administrative changes that could be 
considered, such as evaluating whether 
fluctuations in income throughout the year 
could be disregarded for abatement 
purposes (Inland Revenue, 2017). 
Proposals like these may appear 
‘incremental’, particularly compared to 
grands projets such as a universal basic 
income (UBI) (see Stephens (forthcoming) 
for a fuller evaluation of UBI proposals),6 
but they are the type of reform that would 
in practice make a real improvement to the 
outcomes of the tax–benefit interface and 
deserve consideration.
1 The Best Start programme can only be received for children 
born after 1 July 2018. Given the assumed ages of the 
children in these scenarios, the families would in practice be 
ineligible for this transfer. For illustrative purposes, however, 
the Best Start programme is assumed to be fully operational 
in this article.
2 It is also possible to receive an additional $20 per week 
disregard for childcare costs. However, this additional 
disregard is not modelled in this article.
3 This figure can be derived in the following way. Assume the 
person’s gross earnings increase by $1.00 from $100.00 
per week to $101.00. Their net benefit will abate against 
this increase in gross income, so will reduce by 30 cents 
(30% of $1.00). Grossing this up means the gross benefit 
will reduce by 36.4 cents (30 cents divided by 82.5% 
(100% minus 17.5%)). The result will be that the gross 
assessable income will increase by 63.6 cents ($1.00 
minus 36.4 cents), and the tax on this income is 11.1 cents 
(17.5% of 63.6 cents) and ACC levy is 1.39 cents. Net 
income thus increases by 51.1 cents, giving an EMTR of 
48.9%.
4 Limitations of EMTRs include that they generally only 
measure change over the next dollar of income and do not 
account for factors like take-up rates, institutional features of 
welfare benefits, such as work tests and stand-down periods, 
characteristics of the labour market (such as labour market 
segmentation), and access to childcare (Nolan, P., 2018).
5 Note that some demographic criteria are more responsive to 
tax-benefit programmes than others. For instance, in contrast 
to age of children, criteria like civil status are more likely 
to respond to the incentives contained in the tax–benefit 
interface (Nolan, P., 2008).
6 While fiscal cost is often cited as the major barrier to 
introducing a universal basic income (UBI) the failure of this 
policy to adequately recognise population heterogeneity is 
potentially a much more serious problem. Current proposals 
for a UBI in New Zealand would, for example, represent a 
significant shift in the balance in the tax–benefit interface to 
particularly favour couples without children at the expense 
of sole-parent families. Sole-parent families with larger 
numbers of children would be especially disadvantaged.
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